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Abstract. Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network,
where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among
them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players
chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate his/her opinion, and then it
spreads along the edges in the graphs. The objective of every player is
to maximize the number of vertices the opinion infects. In this paper,
we investigate a computational problem of asking whether a pure Nash
equilibrium exists in the competitive diffusion game on unweighed and
weighted graphs, and present several negative and positive results. We
first prove that the problem is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the
number of players even for unweighted graphs. We also show that the
problem is NP-hard even for series-parallel graphs with positive integer
weights, and is NP-hard even for forests with arbitrary integer weights.
Furthermore, we show that the problem for forest of paths with arbi-
trary weights is solvable in pseudo-polynomial time; and it is solvable in
quadratic time if a given graph is unweighted. We also prove that the
problem for chain, cochain, and threshold graphs with arbitrary integer
weights is solvable in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Social networks plays an important role in human interactions in recent years,
through which we can propagate ideas, findings, innovations and trends. An
action some influential users exhibit spreads over social networks, and greatly
affects public opinion formation. The dynamics of such diffusion process is a ma-
jor research subject on game-theoretic analysis of social networks. In particular,
Alon et al. [1] focused on a setting of a diffusion process where a number of
players compete to propagate their opinions on a topic over a social network. In
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Fig. 1. Example of competitive diffusion with k = 3 players. (a) The graph G
and weight w; numbers in the gray squares are weights. (b) p1, p2 and p3 choose
v1, v7 and v9 in G, respectively; thus a strategy profile s = (v1, v7, v9). (c) Each
player dominates the neighbor. (d) The game ends; the two gray vertices are
neutral. Consequently, U1(s) = 2, U2(s) = 3 and U3(s) = 1.
this setting, each player chooses a user who acts as a seed of the opinion, and
then the opinion spreads along the connections in a social network in discrete
time step. The objective of every player is to maximize the number of users their
opinions infect. This setting models, for example, a situation where a number of
firms compete in a specific market, and want to advertise their products via viral
marketing; each firm chooses an influential user to maximize the number of users
who buy their product. Alon et al. formalized this process as the competitive dif-
fusion game on unweighted graphs. In this paper, we generalize the game to
weighted graphs, and investigate its computational complexity. We below define
the game more formally.
In the competitive diffusion game, a social network is modeled by an undi-
rected graph G = (V,E), where the vertex set V represents users, the edge set
E does their connections; thus, their neighbors do friends they communicate.
After some user exhibits an opinion, it spreads along the edges in the graph.
We then define a weight function w : V → Z which represents a level of im-
portance of each user; we admit that a weight on a vertex can be negative to
express, for example, a very demanding customer. For a positive integer k, we
define [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and call the k players p1, p2, . . . , pk. The competitive
diffusion game (k,G,w) proceeds as follows. (See Fig. 1(a)-(d) for an explicit
example.) At time one, each player chooses a vertex in V ; suppose a player pi,
i ∈ [k], chooses a vertex v ∈ V . If any other player pj , i 6= j, does not choose the
vertex v, then pi dominates v; and otherwise (that is, if there exists a player pj ,
i 6= j, who chooses v), v becomes a neutral vertex which no player can dominate
in the following time steps. For each time t, t ≥ 2, a vertex v ∈ V is dominated
by a player pi at time t if (i) v is neither neutral nor dominated by any player
by time (t− 1), and (ii) v has a neighbor dominated by pi, but does not have a
neighbor dominated by any player pj , i 6= j. If v satisfies (i) and there are two
or more players who dominate neighbors of v, then v becomes a neutral vertex
at time t. The game ends when no player can dominate a vertex any more.
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Fig. 2. The vertex v3 becomes neutral at time 2, and consequently, p3 dominates
v4 at time 7.
Let s = (s(1), s(2), . . . , s(k)) ∈ V k be the vector of vertices which the players
choose at the beginning of the game. We call s a strategy profile. For every i ∈ [k],
we define a utility Ui(s) of pi for s as the sum of the weights of the vertices which
pi dominates at the end. (See Fig. 1(d).)
We note that a neutral vertex is a key notion of the competitive diffusion
game; it sometimes gives critical effect on the result. (See Fig 2.) This contrasts
to a similar game, called Voronoi game, where a player can dominate all the
nearest vertices; if there is a vertex whose distances to strategies of two or more
players tie, then they do not dominate but share the vertex [2,4,13].
For an index i ∈ [k], we define (s−i, v′) as a strategy profile such that pi
chooses v′ instead of s(i), but any other player pj , i 6= j, chooses s(j): (s−i, v) =
(s(1), s(2), . . . , s(i−1), v′, s(i+1), . . . , s(k)). For simplicity, we write Ui(s−i, v′) for
Ui((s−i, v′)). Then, if s satisfies
Ui(s−i, v′) ≤ Ui(s) (1)
for every i ∈ [k] and every v′ ∈ V , we say that s is a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile given in Fig. 1(b) is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium.
Since Alon et al. proposed the competitive diffusion game in [1], several
results are obtained for the game on unweighted graphs. In the same paper,
Alon et al. observed that there exists an unweighted graph G of diameter three
such that (2, G,w) does not admit a Nash equilibrium [1]. Takehara improved
their result and showed that there exists an unweighted graph G of diameter
two such that (2, G,w) does not admit a Nash equilibrium [11]. (Besides, they
refute a theorem given in [1].) Small and Mason considered the case where a
social network has a tree structure, and show that, for any unweighted tree G,
(2, G,w) has a Nash equilibrium [10].
In this paper, we consider a problem, named Competitive Diffusion, of
deciding whether, given the number k, a graph G and weight function w, the
competitive diffusion game (k,G,w) has a Nash equilibrium. Recently, Etesami
and Baser studied the problem, and showed that Competitive Diffusion is a
NP-complete problem [3]. We strengthen their result, and generalize it in terms
of weight functions. More formally, we obtain the following three negative results:
(i) Competitive Diffusion is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number
of players even for unweighted graphs; (ii) Competitive Diffusion is NP-
complete even for series-parallel graphs with positive integer weights; and (iii)
Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for forests with arbitrary integer
weights. Our results imply that the computational complexity of Competitive
Diffusion may be much influenced by weights on vertices. We note that the
results given in [3] does not imply ours.
Furthermore, we obtain several positive results on Competitive Diffu-
sion. For forests of paths, we prove that Competitive Diffusion is solvable
in pseudo-polynomial time. In particular, we give a quadratic-time algorithm
for forests of unweighted paths. For chain, cochain, and threshold graphs with
arbitrary integer weights, we also provide polynomial time algorithms. To the
best of our knowledge, no nontrivial algorithm is known even for unweighted
version of Competitive Diffusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
hardness results for Competitive Diffusion. In Section 3, we give algorithms
for forests of paths. In Section 4, we provide an algorithm for chain, cochain,
and threshold graphs.
2 Complexity of Competitive Diffusion
In this section, we show that Competitive Diffusion is basically hard compu-
tational problem. In Section 2.1, we show W[1]-hardness for unweighted graphs.
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we show NP-completeness for series-parallel graphs with
nonnegative integer weights and NP-completeness for forests with arbitrary in-
teger weights, respectively.
2.1 Unweighted Graphs
In this section, we prove that the problem is W [1]-hard for the number of players,
as in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Competitive Diffusion is W [1]-hard even for unweighted
graphs when parameterized by the number of players.
We prove the theorem by reduction from a well-known W [1]-hard problem,
Independent Set [5]. Given a graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer k,
Independent Set asks whether there exists an independent set I of size at
least k, where a set I(⊆ V ) is called an independent set if there is no pair of
vertices u, v ∈ I such that (u, v) ∈ E. Below we show that, given G and k, one
can construct a competitive diffusion game (k + 3, G′, w′) such that G has an
independent set I of size |I| ≥ k if and only if (k + 3, G′, w′) has a pure Nash
equilibrium, where G′ and w′ is a graph and weight obtained from G. Let n = |V |
and m = |E|, and let δv be the degree of v for every v ∈ V .
Fig. 3. Unweighted graph G′. (a) Graph A. (b) Graph B; The black vertices
originate from G, and compose V .
[Construction of G′ and w′]
The graph G′ consists of two disjoint component graphs A = (VA, EA) and
B = (VB , EB).
We obtain the graph A as follows. We construct a path of four vertices
a1, a2, a3, a4; and make 2n vertices a
′
1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
n and a
′′
1 , a
′′
2 , . . . , a
′′
n. Then we
connect a1 to a
′
1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
n, and connect a4 to a
′′
1 , a
′′
2 , . . . , a
′′
n. See Fig. 3(a).
We obtain the graph B from the original graph G as follows. For every edge
e = (u, v) ∈ E, we add a vertex be subdividing e. Then, for each v ∈ V , we make
a setDv of n−δv vertices, and connect v to every u ∈ Dv. Lastly we make a vertex
b and λ vertices b1, b2, . . . , bλ, where λ is a sufficiently large number satisfying
λ = Θ(n3), and connect b to every v ∈ V , and connect b to b1, b2, . . . , bλ.
Thus, G′ = (V ′, E′) is such a graph that V ′ = VA ∪ VB and E′ = EA ∪ EB .
We define the weight of every vertex as one: w′ : V ′ → {1}.
We now show that G has an independent set I of size |I| ≥ k if and only if
(k + 3, G′, w′) has a pure Nash equilibrium. We first verify the sufficiency.
Lemma 1. If there exists an independent set I ⊆ V satisfying k ≤ |I|, then
(k + 3, G′, w′) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let I ′ ⊆ I be an arbitrary fixed subset of I such that |I ′| = k, and let
v1, v2, . . . , vk be the vertices in I
′. Then the following strategy profile s∗ is shown
to be a Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile s∗: For each i ∈ [k], pi chooses vi. The player pk+1
chooses b. The players pk+2 and pk+3 choose a2 and a3, respectively.
Let us estimate the utility of each player. Firstly, consider pi for every i ∈ [k].
The player pi chooses vi, and vi is connected to n − δv vertices in Dv and δv
subdivisions. Since I ′ is an independent set, pi dominates all these vertices.
However, at time two, pk+1 dominates every vertex in V \I ′. Thus, for every
i ∈ [k],
Ui(s
∗) = n+ 1. (2)
Secondly, consider the player pk+1. Since pk+1 dominates at least b and
b1, b2, . . . , bλ,
Uk+1(s
∗) ≥ λ+ 1. (3)
Lastly, we have
Uk+2(s
∗) = Uk+3(s∗) = n+ 2. (4)
Below we show that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium by verifying Eq. (1). We omit
the cases where a player changes the strategy to a vertex chosen by another
player.
(i) p1, p2, . . . , pk
Consider an arbitrary player pi, i ∈ [k]. If pi chooses a vertex in VA, then,
clearly pi dominates at most n + 1 vertices. If pi chooses be for some e ∈ E or
u ∈ Dv for some v, then pi dominates exactly one vertex due to pk+1. Suppose pi
chooses v′ ∈ V . If there exists e = (u, v′) such that u ∈ I ′, pi does not dominate
a vertex be, and hence pi dominates less than n + 1 vertices. Otherwise, pi
dominates exactly n + 1 vertices, as in Eq. (2). Thus, the utility of pi does not
increase from Eq. (2).
(ii) pk+1
If pk+1 chooses any vertex in VA, pk+1 dominates at most n + 1 vertices. If
pk+1 chooses any vertex in VB\{b}, pk+1 cannot dominate b, and hence dominates
at most
|VB\{b, b1, b2, . . . , bλ}| = n+m+
∑
v∈V
(n− δv) = n2 + n−m.
Since λ = Θ(n3), the utility of pk+1 does not increase from Eq. (3).
(iii) pk+2, pk+3
Both of pk+2 and pk+3 dominate at most n+ 1 vertices, as same in (i). Thus,
the utilities of pk+2 and pk+3 do not increase from Eq. (4).
We can also verify the necessity which complete the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 2. If (k + 3, G′, w′) has a Nash equilibrium, then we can construct an
independent set I of G such that |I| = k.
Proof. Let s∗ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (k+ 3, G′, w′). We say that a
strategy profile s is standard if s satisfies the following conditions:
(A.1) k players choose different k vertices in V ⊆ V ′.
(A.2) A player choose b ∈ V ′.
(A.3) Two players choose a2, a3 ∈ V ′.
We then have the following proposition whose proof will be given in the appendix.
Proposition 1. If (k+3, G′, w′) has a Nash equilibrium s∗, then s∗ is standard.
Proposition 1 implies that s∗ is standard. Thus, without loss of generality,
we can assume that the player pi chooses vi ∈ V for every i ∈ [k], pk+1 does b,
pk+2 does a2, and pk+3 does a3. Then, we can show that I = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} is
an independent set, as follows.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an edge e = (vi, vi′) ∈
E for i, i′ ∈ [k]. Since be becomes neutral at time two, neither pi nor pi′ dominate
be. Moreover, pk+1 dominates every vertex v ∈ V \I ′. Thus, we have Ui(s∗) ≤ n
and Ui′(s
∗) ≤ n. On the other hand, if the players pi and pi′ change their
strategy to a1 (or a2), they dominate n + 1 vertices: Ui(s
∗
−i, a1) = n + 1 and
Ui′(s
∗
−i, a1) = n+ 1, which contradict that s
∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Nonnegative Integer Weights
In this section, we consider graphs with nonnegative integer weights, and prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for series-parallel
graphs with nonnegative integer weights.
It is easy to observe that Competitive Diffusion is contained in NP:
Given the number k of players, graph G, weight w and a strategy profile s, we
can compute Ui(s) for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, in polynomial time just by simulating
the game (k,G,w). Thus, we can verify in polynomial time whether s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium by checking Eq. (1) for every pair of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and u′ ∈ V .
We below prove that Competitive Diffusion is NP-hard by a reduction
from Partition which asks, given a multiset S = {s1, s2, . . . , s2n} of 2n positive
integers, whether there exists a subset S′ ⊆ [2n] such that
α =
∑
j∈S′
sj =
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj (5)
where α = (
∑2n
j=1 sj)/2. Partition is well-known to be NP-complete [6].
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Fig. 4. Graph GS for nonnegative integer weights. (a) Graph A. (b) Graph B.
We below construct a series-parallel graph GS and a weight function wS
for GS such that there exists S
′ ⊆ [2n] satisfying Eq. (5) if and only if (2n +
4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium.
[Construction of GS and wS ]
The graph GS consists of two disjoint component graphs A = (VA, EA) and
B = (VB , EB).
The graph A is a path of four vertices a1, a2, a3, a4, where for every i, 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, wS(a1) = 2α,wS(a2) = 1, wS(a3) = 1, wS(a4) = 2α. See Fig. 4(a).
We construct B, as follows. For every j ∈ [2n], we make a cycle of five vertices
bj,1, bj,2, bj,3, bj,4, bj,5 placed in clockwise order. We complete B by adding two
vertices b′ and b′′, and connecting b′ to bj,2 while connecting b′′ to bj,5 for every
j ∈ [2n]. The weights of the vertices in VB are defined as follows: wS(bj,1) =
sj , wS(bj,2) = 0, wS(bj,3) = α, wS(bj,4) = α, wS(bj,5) = 0; and wS(b
′) =
wS(b
′′) = α. See Fig. 4(b).
We now verify the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3. If there exists S′ ⊆ [2n] satisfying Eq. (5), then (2n + 4, GS , wS)
has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let S′ ⊆ [2n] be a subset satisfying Eq. (5), and let S′′ = [2n]\S′. Note
that |S′| + |S′′| = 2n. Then, the following strategy profile s∗ is shown to be a
Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile s∗: For each i ∈ [2n], pi chooses bi,4 if i ∈ S′; and does
bi,3 if i ∈ S′′. The player p2n+1 chooses b′, p2n+2 does b′′, p2n+3 does a2, and
p2n+4 does a3.
We estimate the utility of each player. Consider an arbitrary player pi, i ∈
[2n]. Since, for every j ∈ [2n], bj,2 and bj,5 either become neutral or is dominated
by p2n+1 or p2n+2, we have, for every i ∈ [2n],
Ui(s
∗) = 2α. (6)
The player p2n+1 dominates b
′ together with bj′,1 and bj′,2 for every j′ ∈ S′.
Thus,
U2n+1(s
∗) = α+
∑
j′∈S′
sj′ = 2α. (7)
Similarly, p2n+2 dominates b
′′ together with bj′′,1 and bj′′,5 for every j′′ ∈ S′′.
Thus,
U2n+2(s
∗) = α+
∑
j′′∈S′′
sj′′ = 2α. (8)
Each of p2n+3 and p2n+4 dominate the two vertices in A, and hence
U2n+3(s
∗) = U2n+4(s∗) = 2α+ 1. (9)
We now verify that s is a Nash equilibrium. We omit the cases where a player
changes the strategy to a vertex already chosen by another player.
(i) p1, p2, . . . , p2n, p2n+3, p2n+4
Consider an arbitrary player pi, i ∈ [2n]. Clearly, Ui(s∗−i, v′) ≤ 2α for every
v′ ∈ VA. If pi changes the strategy to v′ ∈ {bj,1, bj,2, bj,3, bj,4, bj,5} for some
j ∈ [2n]\{i}, then Ui(s∗−i, v′) ≤ α < 2α due to pj , p2n+1 and p2n+2; and if pi
changes the strategy to v′ ∈ {bi,1, bi,2, bi,3, bi,4, bi,5}, then Ui(s∗−i, v′) ≤ 2α due
to p2n+1 and p2n+2, as desired.
We can similarly verify the case for p2n+3 and p2n+4.
(ii) p2n+1 and p2n+2
Let i ∈ {2n+ 1, 2n+ 2}. Smilarly to (i), Ui(s∗−i, v′) ≤ 2α for every v′ ∈ VA.
If pi changes the strategy to v
′ ∈ {bj,1, bj,2, bj,3, bj,4, bj,5} for some j ∈ [2n], then
Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ sj + α ≤ 2α, as desired.
Lemma 4. If (2n + 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium, then there exists S
′ ⊆
[2n] satisfying Eq. (5).
Proof. Let s∗ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (2n+ 4, GS , wS). We say that
a strategy profile s is standard if s satisfies the following conditions:
(B.1) For every i ∈ [2n], exactly one player chooses bi,3 or bi,4; and no player
chooses bi,1, bi,2 or bi,5.
(B.2) Exactly one player chooses b′ ∈ VB , and exactly one player does b′′.
(B.3) Exactly one player chooses a2 ∈ VA, and exactly one player does a3.
We then have the following proposition whose proof will be given in the appendix.
Proposition 2. If (2n+ 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium s
∗, then s∗ is stan-
dard.
Proposition 2 implies that s∗ is standard. Let S′ (resp., S′′) be the set of
indices i ∈ [2n] which a player chooses bi,4 (resp., bi,3). Let p2n+1 and p2n+2 be
the players choosing b′ and b′′, respectively. Clearly,
U2n+1(s
∗) = α+
∑
j′∈S′
sj′ , (10)
while
U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), a1) = 2α. (11)
Since s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, Eqs. (10) and (11) imply that 2α ≤ α+∑j′∈S′ sj′ ,
and hence
α ≤
∑
j′∈S′
sj′ . (12)
Similarly, we have U2n+2(s
∗) = α+
∑
j′′∈S′ sj′′ , and hence
α ≤
∑
j′∈S′′
sj′′ . (13)
Since
∑
j′∈S′ sj′ +
∑
j′′∈S′′ sj′′ = 2α, Eqs. (12) and (13) imply that S
′ and S′′
are the desired partition.
2.3 Arbitrary Integer Weights
In this section, we prove that the problem is NP-hard even for forests.
Theorem 3. Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for forests of two
components.
To prove the theorem, we employ Partition, as in the proof of Theorem 2;
but we here assume that the subset S′ satisfies |S′| = n; Partition remains
NP-complete under this additional condition [6]. Moreover, We assume without
loss of generality that s1, s2, . . . , s2n are even; if it is not the case, we simply
double each of s1, s2, . . . , s2n.
a1 a2 a3 a4
α 1 1 α
α+ 1 0 -1 -α α+ 1
b1,1
b1
b1, 2
b1, 3
α -α
s1-α+
α
b2,1
b2
b2, 2
b2, 3
α -α
α
-α+s2
b1
b , 22n
α -α
α
b ,12n b ,32n-α+s2n
A(a)
B(b)
b'1 b'2 b'3
b'4
b'5
Fig. 5. Graph GS for arbitrary integer weights. (a) Graph A. (b) Graph B.
Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , s2n} be an input of Partition, and α = (
∑2n
j=1 sj)/2.
We show that one can construct a forest GS and a weight function wS for GS
such that there exists S′ ⊆ [2n] that satisfies |S′| = n and Eq. (5) if and only
if (2n + 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium. The graph GS consists of two trees
A = (VA, EA) and B = (VB , EB).
[Construction of GS and wS ]
The graph A is a path of four vertices a1, a2, a3, a4, where for every i, 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, wS(a1) = α,wS(a2) = 1, wS(a3) = 1, wS(a4) = α. See Fig. 5(a).
We then construct B, as follows. For every j ∈ [2n], we make a graph Bj
consisting of a vertex bj together with bj,1, bj,2 and bj,3 which compose a com-
plete bipartite graph K1,3. We complete B by making a path of five vertices
b′1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4, b
′
5, and connecting b
′
4 to bj for every j ∈ [2n]. The weights of the ver-
tices in VB are defined as follows: For every j ∈ [2n], wS(bj) = −α+sj , wS(bj,1) =
α,wS(bj,2) = α,wS(bj,3) = −α; and wS(b′1) = α + 1, wS(b′2) = 0, wS(b′3) =
−1, wS(b′4) = −α,wS(b′5) = α+ 1. See Fig. 5(b).
Similarly to the previous sections, we can prove that there exists S′ ⊆ [2n]
satisfying Eq. (5) if and only if (2n + 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium. The
proof is omitted, but given in the the appendix.
3 Algorithms for Forests of Paths
In the last section, we have shown that Competitive Diffusion is a compu-
tationally hard problem. However, we can solve the problem for some particu-
lar graph classes. In Section 3.1, we give a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm
to solve Competitive Diffusion for forests of weighted paths; as its conse-
quence, we show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time for forest of
unweighted paths. In Section 3.2, we improve the running time of our algorithm
to a quadratic time for the unweighted case.
3.1 Forests of weighted paths
Let F be a forest consisting of weighted m paths P1, P2, . . . , Pm, and let Wj
be the sum of the positive weights in a path Pj , j ∈ [m]. Then, we define
W = maxj∈[m]Wj as the upper bound on utility for F , that is, any player can
obtain at most W in F . In this subsection, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let F be a forest of weighted paths. Let n and W be the number
of vertices in F and the upper bound on utility for F , respectively. Then, we can
solve Competitive Diffusion, and find a Nash equilibrium, if any, in O(Wn9)
time.
We note that W = O(n) if F is an unweighted graph. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 4, Competitive Diffusion is solvable in O(n10) time for an unweighted
graph F ; this running time will be improved to O(n2) in Section 3.2.
Idea and definitions.
Let F be a given forest consisting of weighted m paths P1, P2, . . . , Pm. Let
w be a given weight function; we sometimes denote by wj the weight function
restricted to the path Pj , j ∈ [m]. Suppose that, for an integer k, there exists a
strategy profile s for the game (k, F,w) that is a Nash equilibrium. Then, the
strategy profile restricted to each path Pj , j ∈ [m], forms a Nash equilibrium for
(kj , Pj , wj), where kj is the number of players who chose vertices in Pj . However,
the other direction does not always hold: A Nash equilibrium sj for (kj , Pj , wj) is
not always extended to a Nash equilibrium for the whole forest F , because some
player may increase its utility by moving to another path in F . To capture such
a situation, we classify a Nash equilibrium for a (single) path Pj more precisely.
Consider the game (κj , Pj , wj) for an integer κj ≥ 0. For a strategy profile sj
for (κj , Pj , wj), we define µPj (sj) as the minimum utility over all the κj players:
µPj (sj) = mini∈[κj ] Ui(sj). In other words, any player in Pj obtains the utility
at least µPj (sj). For the case where κj = 0, we define sj = ∅ as the unique
strategy profile for (κj , Pj , wj); then, sj is a Nash equilibrium and we define
µPj (sj) = +∞.
For a strategy profile sj =
(
s
(1)
j , s
(2)
j , . . . , s
(κj)
j
)
for (κj , Pj , wj), we then de-
fine the “potential” of the maximum utility under sj that can be expected to
gain by an extra player other than the κj players. More formally, for a vertex
v in Pj , we denote by sj + v the strategy profile
(
s
(1)
j , s
(2)
j , . . . , s
(κj)
j , s
(κj+1)
j
)
for (κj + 1, Pj , wj) such that s
(κj+1)
j = v. Then, we define νPj (sj) =
maxv∈V (Pj) Uκj+1(sj + v).
For two nonnegative integers κj and t, we say that Pj admits κj players
with a boundary t if there exists a strategy profile sj such that sj is a Nash
equilibrium for (κj , Pj , wj) and νPj (sj) ≤ t ≤ µPj (sj) holds. Then, the following
lemma characterizes a Nash equilibrium of the game (k, F,w) in terms of the
components of F ; the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 5. The game (k, F,w) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist
nonnegative integers κ1, κ2, . . . , κm and t such that k =
∑m
j=1 κj and Pj admits
κj players with the common boundary t for every j ∈ [m].
Algorithm.
We first focus on a weighted single path.
Lemma 6. Let P be a weighted path of n vertices, and t be a nonnegative in-
teger. Then, one can find in O(n9) time the set K ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 2n} of all the
integers κ such that P admits κ players with boundary t.
Based on Lemma 6, we can obtain the m sets K1,K2, . . . ,Km ⊆
{0, 1, . . . , 2n}, where Kj ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 2n}, j ∈ [m], is the set of all the inte-
gers κ such that P admits κ players with boundary t. This can be done in O(n9)
time, where n is the number of vertices in the whole forest F .
We now claim that, for a given integer t, it can be decided in O(n3) time
whether there exist nonnegative integers κ1, κ2, . . . , κm such that k =
∑m
j=1 κj
and Pj admits κj players with the common boundary t for every j ∈ [m]; later
we will apply this procedure to all possible values of t, 0 ≤ t ≤ W . To show
this, observe that finding desired m integers κ1, κ2, . . . , κm from the m sets
K1,K2, . . . ,Km can be regarded as solving an instance of the multiple-choice
knapsack problem [8]: The capacity c of the knapsack is equal to k; Each integer
κ′ in Kj , j ∈ [m], corresponds to an item with profit κ′ and cost κ′; The items
from the same set Kj form one class, from which at most one item can be packed
into the knapsack. The multiple-choice knapsack problem can be solved in O(cN)
time [8], where N is the number of all items. Since c = k and N = O(mn), we
can solve the corresponding instance in time O(kmn) = O(n3).
We finally apply the procedure above to all possible values of boundaries t.
Since any player can obtain at most the upper bound W on utility for F , it
suffices to consider t ∈ [W ]. Therefore, our algorithm runs in O(Wn9) time in
total.
3.2 Forests of unweighted paths
In this subsection, we improve the running time of our algorithm in Section 3.1
to a quadratic time when restricted to the unweighted case.
Theorem 5. Let F be a forest of unweighted paths, and n be the number of
vertices in F . Then, we can solve Competitive Diffusion, and find a Nash
equilibrium, if any, in O(n2) time.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider unweighted graphs, and thus define
w : V → {1} for the vertex set V of a given forest. We assume that the number
k of players is less than n; otherwise, a Nash equilibrium always exists. Note
that, in this case, every player has utility at least one for any Nash equilibrium.
We first show that the set Kj of Lemma 6 can be obtained in O(1) time,
instead of O(n9) time, by characterizing Nash equilibriums for (κ, P,w) in terms
of κ, t and n.
Lemma 7. Let P be a single unweighted path of n vertices, and let κ and t be
nonnegative and positive integers, respectively.
(1) P admits κ = 0 player with t if and only if n ≤ t.
(2) P admits κ = 1 player with t if and only if t ≤ n ≤ 2t+ 1.
(3) P admits κ = 2 players with t if and only if 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t+ 2.
(4) P admits κ = 3 players with t if and only if t = 1 and n = 3, 4 or 5.
(5) For any integer κ ≥ 4, P admits κ players with t if and only if
(κ+ 1)t− 1 ≤ n ≤ (2κ− 4)t+ κ if κ is odd;
κt ≤ n ≤ (2κ− 4)t+ κ if κ is even. (14)
By Lemme 7, we can immediately obtain the number of players which P
admits with a given boundary t:
Corollary 1. Consider a fixed boundary t. If P is a path of n vertices, the
numbers of players which P admits with a boundary t is given as follows.
(1) If n ≤ t− 1, the number is only 0.
(2) If n = t, the numbers are 0 and 1.
(3) If t+ 1 ≤ n ≤ 2t− 1, the number is only 1.
(4) If 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 1 and n = 3, the numbers are 1, 2 and 3; and if 2t ≤ n ≤
2t+ 1 and n 6= 3, the numbers are 1 and 2.
(5) If n = 2t+ 2 and n = 4, the numbers are 2, 3 and 4; and if n = 2t+ 2 and
n 6= 4, the number is only 2.
(6) If 2t+ 3 ≤ n ≤ 4t− 1, P has no desired Nash equilibrium.
(7) If 4t ≤ n and 5 ≤ n, the numbers are integers κ such that⌈
n+ 4t
2t+ 1
⌉
≤ κ ≤ max(kodd, keven),
where kodd is the maximum odd integer satisfying kodd ≤ (n− t+ 1)/t, and
keven is the maximum even integer satisfying keven ≤ n/t.
We use Corollary 1 to design our algorithm for forests of paths.
Without loss of generality, we assume that P1 is a longest path among the
m paths, and has n1 vertices. For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n1, we repeat the following
procedure: For every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we obtain, using Corollary 1, the minimum
number kminj and the maximum number k
max
j of players which Pj admits with
the boundary t. Corollary 1 implies that, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Pj admits κ
players with t for any κ between kminj and k
max
j , and hence (k, F,w) has a Nash
equilibrium with the common boundary t if and only if
m∑
j=1
kminj ≤ k ≤
m∑
j=1
kmaxj . (15)
We thus complete the procedure by checking if the two inequalities in (15) both
hold. Since Corollary 1 implies that we can obtain kminj and k
max
j in constant
time for every j, the running time of the procedure above for single t is O(m),
and hence that of our entire algorithm is O(n1m) = O(n
2), as desired.
4 Algorithms for Chain, Cochain, and Threshold Graphs
A bipartite graph B = (X,Y ;E) with |X| = p and |Y | = q is a chain graph
if there is an ordering (x1, x2, . . . , xp) on X such that N(x1) ⊆ N(x2) ⊆ · · · ⊆
N(xp), where N(u) denote a set of neighbors of a vertex u. If there is such
an ordering on X, then there also exists an ordering (y1, y2, . . . , yq) on Y such
that N(y1) ⊆ N(y2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ N(yq). We call such orderings inclusion orderings.
A graph B′ is a cochain graph if it can be obtained from a chain graph B =
(X,Y ;E) by making the independents sets X and Y into cliques. A graph B′′
is a threshold graph if it can be obtained from a chain graph B = (X,Y ;E)
by making one of the independents sets X and Y into a clique. Observe that
inclusion orderings on X and Y in B can be seen as inclusion orderings in B′ and
B′′ if we use closed neighborhoods in cliques. Such inclusion orderings can be
found in linear time [7]. Because the algorithm for chain graphs we will describe
in this section depends only on its property of having inclusion orderings, we
can apply the exactly same algorithm for cochain graphs and threshold graphs.
The following lemma follows directly from the definitions. Note that N [u] =
N(u) ∪ {u}.
Lemma 8. If N(u) ⊆ N(v) or N [u] ⊆ N [v] holds for u = s(i) 6= v = s(j), then
Ui(s) =
{
0 if there is h 6= i such that s(h) = u,
w(u) otherwise.
In what follows, let B = (X,Y ;E) be a chain graph with inclusion orderings
(x1, . . . , xp) and (y1, . . . , yq) on X and Y , respectively. We define η(s, X) =
max({0} ∪ {i | xi ∈ V (s)}) and η(s, Y ) = max({0} ∪ {i | yi ∈ V (s)}).
Lemma 9. Let s be a Nash equilibrium of B. If s(i) /∈ {xη(s,X), yη(s,Y )}, then
w(s(i)) ≥ max{w(u) | u ∈ ({xj | j ≤ η(s, X)} ∪ {yj | j ≤ η(s, Y )}) \ V (s)} .(16)
Proof. Since N(s(i)) ⊆ N(xη(s,X)) or N(s(i)) ⊆ N(yη(s,Y )), it follows that
Ui(s) ≤ w(s(i)) by Lemma 8. Suppose for the contrary that there exists
u ∈ ({xj | j ≤ η(s, X)} ∪ {yj | j ≤ η(s, Y )}) \ V (s) such that w(s(i)) < w(u).
Now it holds that N(u) ⊆ N(xη(s,X)) or N(u) ⊆ N(yη(s,Y )). Thus, by Lemma 8,
we have Ui(s−i, u) = w(u) > w(s(i)) ≥ Ui(s). This contradicts the assumption
that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, it suffices to check the strategy profiles satisfying Eq. (16) for our
purpose.
Algorithm 1 Find a Nash equilibrium s ∈ V k of a chain graph B = (X,Y ;E)
1: Let (x1, . . . , xp) on X and (y1, . . . , yq) on Y be inclusion orderings.
2: // The following is for the case where η(s, X) 6= 0.
3: for all guesses (η(s, X), η(s, Y )) ∈ {1, . . . , p} × {0, . . . , q} do
4: s(1) := xη(s,X). s
(2) := yη(s,Y ) if η(s, Y ) 6= 0.
5: R := {xi | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {yi | i < η(s, Y )}.
6: while there is a player i not assigned to a vertex do
7: v := arg maxu∈R w(u).
8: if w(v) ≥ 0 then
9: s(i) := v. R := R \ {v}.
10: else
11: s(i) := xη(s,X).
12: end if
13: end while
14: return s if it is a Nash equilibrium.
15: end for
16: return “no Nash equilibrium”
Theorem 6. Let G be a chain, cochain, or threshold graph of n vertices and
m edges. Then, we can solve Competitive Diffusion for G, and find a Nash
equilibrium, if any, in O(n4(m+ n)) time.
Proof. We present an algorithm for chain graphs only. As previously described,
we can apply the same algorithm for cochain and threshold graph.
We first guess η(s, X) and η(s, Y ). Here we assume η(s, X) 6= 0. The other
case can be treated in the same way by swapping X and Y . We assign xη(s,X)
to the first player. If η(s, Y ) 6= 0, then we assign yη(s,Y ) to the second player.
By Lemma 9, if s is a Nash equilibrium, then the other players have to select
the heaviest vertices in {xi | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {yi | i < η(s, Y )}. For each of the
remaining players, we assign a vacant vertex with the maximum non-negative
weight. If there is no such a vertex, we assign xη(s,X). We then test whether the
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. See Algorithm 1.
Lemma 9 implies that if the algorithm assigns at most one player to xη(s,X),
then the algorithm is correct. If two or more players are assigned to xη(s,X),
then these players have utility 0. In such a case, there are not enough number of
vertices of non-negative weights in {xi | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {yi | i < η(s, Y )}. Thus
every s with the guesses η(s, X) and η(s, Y ) has a player with non-positive
utility. If such a player, say pi, has negative utility, then s is clearly not a Nash
equilibrium. If pi has utility 0, then it may improve its utility only if there is
a vertex v ∈ {xη(s,X)+1, . . . , xp} ∪ {yη(s,Y )+1, . . . , yq} such that Ui(s−i, v) > 0.
However, in this case, there is no Nash equilibrium with the guesses η(s, X) and
η(s, Y ). Therefore, the algorithm is correct.
We now analyze the running time of the algorithm. We have O(n2) options
for guessing xη(s,X) and yη(s,Y ). For each guess, the bottle-neck of the running
time is to test whether the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium or not. It
takes O(n2(m + n)) time as follows: we have O(n2) candidates of moves of
players; for each candidate, we can compute the utility of the player moved by
running a breadth-first search once in O(m + n) time by adding a virtual root
connecting to all the vertices occupied by the players. In total, the algorithm
runs in O(n4(m+ n)) time.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Our proof of Proposition 1 consists of a sequence of claims, and we prove each
claim by contradiction: we suppose that a claim does not hold, and show that it
contradicts the fact that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let s∗ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (k + 3, G′, w′). We start by the
following claim.
Claim 1. There are at most two players choosing vertices in VA.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there are k′(≥ 3) players choos-
ing vertices in VA. Then there exists a players pi dominating at most one vertex:
Ui(s
∗) ≤ 1. On the other hand, every v ∈ V has n− δv(≥ 1) neighbors for every
v ∈ V , and b has λ + n(≥ 1) neighbors, and thus there are n + 1 vertices (i.e.,
ones in V and b) by which pi can dominate at least two vertices by changing
the strategy. Since we have k′ ≥ 3, there are at most k(≤ n) players choosing
vertices in VB , and hence we have a contradiction.
Then, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. s∗ satisfies A.2.
Proof. Suppose s∗ does not satisfy A.2, that is, no player chooses b. Since Claim 1
implies that at least k + 3 − 2 ≥ 2 players choose vertices in VB , there exists a
player pi who cannot dominate b. Since b1, b2, · · · , bλ are connected only to b, pi
dominates either at most one of b1, b2, · · · , bλ or at most all the other vertices in
VB . Thus,
Ui(s) ≤ n+m+
∑
v∈V
|Dv|
≤ n+m+ n2 − 2m
≤ n2 + n−m.
On the other hand, pi can dominate, by changing the strategy to b, at least b
together with some of b1, b2, · · · , bλ and the vertices in V . In this case, since
each of the other k + 2 ≤ n + 2 players can dominate at most two vertices of
b1, b2, · · · , bλ and the vertices in V due to pi, we have
Ui(s−i, b) ≥ λ− 2(n+ 2) = Θ(n3).
We complete the proof of Lemma 1 by verifying the following two claims.
Claim 3. s∗ satisfies A.3.
Proof. By Claim 1, it suffices to consider the case where there are at most two
players choosing vertices in VA.
Consider the case where exactly two players choose vertices in VA other than
“a2 and a3.” Without loss of generality, the chosen vertices are “a1 and a2,” “a1
and a3,” “a1 and a4,” or one of the players chooses a
′
1. For any of them, one
player can increase the utility by choosing a2 or a3.
Consider the other case where at most one player chooses a vertex in VA.
Then, there are at least k + 2 players choosing vertices in VB . Since Claim 2
implies that some player chooses b, each of the other players dominates at most
n+ 1 vertices; let pi be one of them: Ui(s
∗) ≤ n+ 1. On the other hand, we have
either
Ui(s−i, a2) ≥ n+ 2 or Ui(s−i, a3) ≥ n+ 2.
Claim 4. s∗ satisfies A.1.
Proof. Suppose there exists a player pi choosing either u ∈ Dv for some v ∈ V ,
be for some e ∈ E, or one of b1, b2, . . . , bλ. Claim 2 implies that pi dominates
only one vertex: Ui(s
∗) ≤ 1. However, Claim 3 implies that
Ui(s, a1) ≥ n+ 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we prove Proposition 2. As in the last section, our proof consists
of a sequence of claims.
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s∗ of (2n+4, GS , wS). We first verify
the following claim:
Claim 5. s∗ satisfies (B.3).
Proof. Suppose s∗ does not satisfy (B.3). We consider the following three cases
(i), (ii) and (iii).
(i) More than three players choose vertices in A.
Suppose there are at least three players choosing vertices in VA, which implies
that there exists a player p whose utility is at most one. Moreover, at most 2n+1
players choose vertices in VB , and there are 4n+ 2 vertices with weight α. Thus,
the player p obtain the utility α(> 1) by changing the strategy to a vertex in
VB , which contradicts the fact that s
∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Exactly two players choose vertices in A.
Since s∗ does not satisfy (B.3), we can assume without loss of generality that
the two players choose either “a1 and a2,” “a1 and a3” or “ a1 and a4.” For both
cases, a player can increase the utility by choosing a2 or a3.
(iii) At most one player chooses a vertex in A.
In this case, there exists a vertex in VA such that any player obtain utility
2α + 1 by changing the strategy to it. Thus, it suffices to show that one of the
other 2n + 3 (or 2n + 4) players has utility at most 2α. Clearly, the players, in
this case, choose vertices in VB , while the sum of the weights of all the vertices
in VB is ∑
j∈[2n]
(2α+ sj) + α+ α = 4nα+ 4α = 2α(2n+ 2).
Thus, at least one player has utility less than 2α, as desired.
We now consider the other 2n + 2 players choosing vertices in VB . For ev-
ery j, j ∈ [2n], we define Pj as a set of indices of the players who choose
bj,1, bj,2, bj,3, bj,4 or bj,5 on s
∗. We then have the following claim.
Claim 6. For every j ∈ [2n], |Pj | ≤ 1.
Proof. Note that, by Claim 5, any player can obtain the utility 2α by changing
the strategy to a1. Furthermore, the sum of all the weights of the vertices in
VB is exactly 2α(2n + 2). Thus, to derive a contradiction, it suffices to show
that some vertex with a positive weight becomes neutral or there exists a player
whose utility is less than (or more than) 2α.
If there exists j such that |Pj | ≥ 4, then we can verify by exhaustive search
that there must exist a player pi, i ∈ Pj , has the utility less than 2α.
If there exists j such that |Pj | = 3, we can assume that the three players
choose either bj,1, bj,2 and bj,3 or bj,1, bj,4 and bj,5; otherwise, a player pi, i ∈ Pj ,
must have the utility less than 2α or one of bj,1, bj,3 and bj,4 becomes neutral.
Without loss of generality, we consider the former case. Then, the player choosing
bj,1 dominates bj,1 and bj,5, and also may dominate b
′′; but, cannot do any of the
other vertices with positive weights due to the player dominating b′ or the one
choosing bj,2. Thus, the player choosing bj,1 has the utility at most sj +α < 2α.
Suppose there exists j such that |Pj | = 2; let p and p′ be the two players.
We consider the following two cases.
(i) Two players choose b′ and b′′.
In this case, p and p′ can dominate vertices only of bj,1, bj,2, bj,3, bj,4 and bj,5,
the sum of whose weights is 2α+ sj < 4α. Thus, one of p and p
′ has the utility
less than 2α.
(ii) Exactly one player chooses b′ or b′′.
Suppose without loss of generality that a player chooses b′, but no player
does b′′. Then, the two players must choose either “bj,1 and bj,3” or “bj,4 and
bj,5.” However, the player choosing bj,1 (or bj,5) dominates bj,1 and bj,5, and also
may dominate b′′; but cannot do any of the other vertices with positive weights
due to the player choosing b′. Thus, the utility of the player choosing bj,1 (or
bj,5) is sj + α < 2α.
(iii) No player chooses b′ or b′′.
In this case, it suffices to consider the case where the two players choose
either “bj,1 and bj,3,” “bj,1 and bj,4,” “bj,2 and bj,3” or “bj,4 and bj,5,” since,
otherwise, a vertex with a positive integer weight becomes neutral.
We verify only the case for “bj,1 and bj,3,” since the other three cases are
similar. In this case, a player pi choosing bj,1 dominates bj,1 and bj,5. Further-
more, if pi does not dominate b
′′, then the utility is sj < 2α. Otherwise, that is,
if pi dominates b
′′, then pi faced on one of the following two situations for any
j′ ∈ [2n]\{j}: (iii-1) if there exists a player choosing one of bj′,1, bj′,2, bj′,3, bj′,4
and bj′,5, then pi cannot dominate none of them; and (iii-2) if no player chooses
bj′,1, bj′,2, bj′,3, bj′,4 and bj′,5, then either pi dominates none of them or pi does
at least bj′,4. Therefore, pi cannot have the utility exactly 2α.
We thus complete the proof of the claim.
Claim 7. s∗ satisfies (B.1) and (B.2).
Proof. Claims 5 and 6 immediately imply that exactly two players must choose
b′ and b′′, and hence s∗ satisfies (B.2). Therefore, we have |Pj | = 1 for every
j ∈ [2n]; otherwise, a vertex with weight sj such that |Pj | = 0 becomes neu-
tral. Consequently, s∗ satisfies (B.1): otherwise a vertex with a positive weight
becomes neutral, or the game end while such vertex is not dominated by any
player
C Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we prove Theorem 3: we show that there exists S′ ⊆ [2n] satisfying
Eq. (5) if and only if (2n + 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium. We say that a
player p rules Bj , j ∈ [2n], if p dominates all the four vertices bj , bj,1, bj,2 and
bj,3 in Bj .
C.1 Main Proof
We first prove the sufficiency of the theorem.
Lemma 10. If there exists S′ ⊆ [2n] that satisfies |S′| = n and Eq. (5), then
(2n+ 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let S′ ⊆ [2n] be a subset satisfying Eq. (5). We denote by j1, j2, . . . , jn ∈
[2n] the indices of the integers in S′, that is, S = {sj1 , sj2 , . . . , sjn}. Then, the
following strategy profile s∗ is shown to be a Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile s∗: For each i ∈ [n], the players p2i−1 and p2i choose
bji,1 and bji,2, respectively. The player p2n+1 chooses b
′
1, p2n+2 does b
′
5, p2n+3
does a2, and p2n+4 does a3, respectively.
We estimate the utility of each player. Consider the players p2i−1 and p2i for
every i ∈ [n]. Since bi becomes neutral, p2i−1 dominates only bi,1, and p2i does
only bi,2. Thus, for every i ∈ [n],
U2i−1(s∗) = U2i(s∗) = α. (17)
The player p2n+1 dominates only b
′
1 and b
′
2. Thus,
U2n+1(s
∗) = α+ 1. (18)
The player p2n+2 dominates b
′
4 and b
′
5; besides, p2n+2 rules Bj for every j ∈
[2n]\S′. Thus, Eq. (5) implies that
U2n+1(s
∗) = −α+ α+ 1 +
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj = α+ 1. (19)
The players p2n+3 and p2n+4 dominate two vertices in A, and hence
U2n+3(s
∗) = U2n+4(s∗) = α+ 1. (20)
Below we show that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium by verifying Eq. (1). We omit
the cases where a player changes the strategy to a vertex chosen by another
player.
(i) p1, p2, . . . , p2n, p2n+3, p2n+4
Consider an arbitrary player pi, i ∈ [2n] ∪ {2n+ 3, 2n+ 4}. By Eq. (17) and
(20), it suffices to show that Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ α for any v′ ∈ VA ∪ VB . If v′ ∈ VA,
then Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ α. If v′ ∈ {b′2, b′3}, then Ui(s∗−i, v′) = −1. If v′ = b′4, then pi
dominates b′3 and b
′
4, and also rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′. Thus
Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) = −1− α+
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj
and hence Eq. (5) implies that
Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) = −1− α+ α = −1.
Consider v′ ∈ Bj for some j ∈ [2n]. If j ∈ S′, pi dominates either only bj,3 or
bj together with bj,3. Otherwise, since p2n+2 chooses b
′
5, pi just rules Bj . Thus,
Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ sj ≤ α.
(ii) p2n+1
By Eq. (18), it suffices to show that Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ α+ 1 for any v′ ∈ VA∪VB .
Similarly to the case (i), U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), v
′) = α if p2n+1 chooses a vertex in
VA or Bj for some j ∈ [2n]. If v′ ∈ {b′2, b′3}, then p2n+1 dominates b′1, b′2, b′3, and
hence U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), v
′) = α. If v′ = b′4, then p2n+1 dominates b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4,
and also rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′. Thus, by Eq. (5),
U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), v
′) = (α+ 1)− 1− α+
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj
= α+ 1− 1− α+ α
= α.
(iii) p2n+2
By Eq. (19), it suffices to show that Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≤ α + 1 for any v′ ∈ V ′.
Similarly to the case (i), if v′ ∈ VA, U2n+1(s∗−(2n+1), v′) = α. If v′ ∈ Bj for some
j ∈ S′, p2n+2 dominates exactly the same set of the vertices as the one for s∗,
that is, p2n+2 dominates b
′
4, b
′
5, and rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′. Thus,
U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), v
′) = −α+ (α+ 1) +
∑
j∈S′
sj = α+ 1,
since bj becomes neutral for every j ∈ S′. If v′ ∈ {b′2, b′3, b4}, then p2n+2 domi-
nates b′3, b
′
4, b
′
5, and rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′. Thus,
U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), v
′) = −1− α+ (α+ 1) +
∑
j∈S′
sj = α.
.
We below prove the necessity of the theorem.
Lemma 11. If (2n + 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium, there exists S
′ ⊆ [2n]
that satisfies |S′| = n and Eq. (5).
Proof. We show that if (2n+ 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium, then the exists
S′ ⊆ [2n] satisfying Eq. (5). We say that a strategy profile s is standard if s
satisfies the following conditions:
(C.1) There exists a set S′ ⊆ [2n] such that |S′| = n and, for every j ∈ S′,
a player chooses bj,1, a player does bj,2, and no player choose bj and bj,3.
Moreover, for every j ∈ [2n]\S′, no player chooses a vertex in Bj .
(C.2) A player chooses b′1, and a player does b
′
5.
(C.3) A player chooses a2, and a player does a3.
We then have the following lemma whose proof will be given in the next section.
Proposition 3. If (2n+ 4, GS , wS) has a Nash equilibrium s
∗, then s∗ is stan-
dard.
Let s∗ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (2n + 4, GS , wS); Proposition 3
implies that s∗ is standard. Let S′ = {j1, j2, . . . , jn} ⊆ [2n]. We can assume
without loss of generality that, for each i ∈ [n], the players p2i−1 and p2i choose
bji,1 and bji,2, respectively; p2n+1 chooses b
′
1, p2n+2 does b
′
5, p2n+3 does a2, and
p2n+4 does a3.
Since p2n+1 dominates only b
′
1 and b
′
2,
U2n+1(s
∗) = α+ 1. (21)
Besides, if p2n+1 changes the strategy to b
′
4, p2n+1 dominates b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4, and
rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′:
U2n+1(s
∗
−(2n+1), b
′
4) = (α+ 1) + (−1) + α+
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj
=
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj . (22)
Since s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, Eqs. (21) and (22) imply that∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj ≤ α+ 1. (23)
On the other hand, p2n+2 dominates b
′
4, b
′
5, and rules Bj for every j ∈ [2n]\S′:
U2n+2(s
∗) = (α+ 1) + (−α) +
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj
= 1 +
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj . (24)
Besides, if p2n+2 changes the strategy to a1, p2n+2 dominates only a1:
U2n+2(s
∗
−(2n+2), b
′
4) = α. (25)
Therefore, Eqs. (24) and (25) imply that
α ≤ 1 +
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj . (26)
By Eqs. (23) and (26),
α− 1 ≤
∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj ≤ α+ 1.
Since sj is even for every j ∈ [2n], we have∑
j∈[2n]\S′
sj = α,
and hence S′ is the desired partition.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s∗ of (2n+4, GS , wS). For every j ∈ [2n],
we define βj as the number of players who choose vertices in Bj on s
∗.
Firstly, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8. s∗ satisfies (C.3).
Proof. Suppose s∗ does not satisfy (C.3). We derive a contradiction for each of
(i), (ii) and (iii) below.
(i) More than three players choose vertices in A.
In this case, there exists a player pi such that Ui(s
∗) ≤ 1, and at most 2n+1
players choose vertices in VB .
If there exists j ∈ [2n] such that βj = 0, pi can rule Bj by changing the
strategy to bj . Moreover, if pi also dominates b
′
4, pi does b
′
5; and if pi also
dominates bj′ for some j
′ ∈ [2n], pi rules Bj′ . Therefore, since sj is even,
Ui(s
∗
−i, bj) ≥ sj ≥ 2.
Otherwise, that is, if βj ≥ 1 for every j ∈ [2n], then there exists j′ ∈ [2n] such
that βj′ = 1. Thus, pi can dominate only either bj′,1 or bj′,2, and hence, for some
v′ ∈ {bj′,1, bj′,2},
Ui(s
∗
−i, v
′) ≥ α ≥ 2.
(ii) exactly two players choose vertices in A.
Since s∗ does not satisfy (C.3), we can assume without loss of generality that
the two players choose either “a1 and a2,” “a1 and a3” or “ a1 and a4.” For both
cases, a player can increase the utility by choosing a2 or a3.
(iii) at most one player chooses a vertex in A.
In this case, there exists a vertex in VA such that any player obtains utility
α+ 1 by changing the strategy to the vertex. Thus, it suffices to show that some
player has utility at most α. Note that at least 2n+ 3 players choose vertices in
VB in this case.
If there exists j ∈ [2n] such that βj ≥ 2, then one of the players has utility
at most α, as desired. If there exists a pair of j, j′ ∈ [2n] such that βj = βj′ = 1,
one of the players (say, the one who choose a vertex in Bj) cannot dominate b
′
4,
and hence its utility is less than or equals to α, as desired. Otherwise, that is,
if either βj = 0 for every j ∈ [2n] or there exists an unique j ∈ [2n] such that
βj = 1, then the other players choose b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4, b
′
5, and hence some player has
utility at most zero.
We below consider the other 2n+ 2 players who choose vertices in VB .
Claim 9. For every j ∈ [2n], βj ≤ 2; and there exists at most one j ∈ [2n] such
that βj = 1.
Proof. We first prove that βj ≤ 2 for every j ∈ [2n]. Note that, by Claim 8, any
player can obtain the utility α by changing the strategy to a1.
Suppose there exists j, j ∈ [2n], such that βj ≥ 4. Then, the utility of one of
the players is at most 0 < α, as desired.
Suppose there exists j ∈ [2n] such that βj = 3. If the three players do not
choose bj , bj,1 and bj,2, then one of the players has the utility of at most 0 < α;
thus, let pi, pi′ and pi′′ be the players choosing bj , bj,1 and bj,2, respectively. If
some player other than pi, pi′ and pi′′ chooses b
′
4 or b
′
5, the player pi dominates
only bj and bj,3, and hence Ui(s
∗) = −2α + sj < α. If no player chooses b′4 or
b′5, then we have Ui′(s
∗) = α, while Ui′(s∗−i′ , b
′
5) = α+ 1.
We then prove that there exists at most one j ∈ [2n] such that βj = 1.
Suppose there exist j′, j′′ ∈ [2n] such that βj′ = βj′′ = 1. Let pi′ and pi′′ be the
players choosing vertices in Bj′ and Bj′′ , respectively. We consider the following
two cases.
(i) There exists a player pi choosing b
′
4.
In this case, we have Ui′(s
∗) ≤ α, while pi′ can increase the utility as follows:
If no player chooses b′1, Ui′(s
∗
−i′ , b
′
1) = α + 1; similarly, if no player chooses b
′
5,
Ui′(s
∗
i′ , b
′
5) = α+ 1. If there are a player choosing b
′
1 and one choosing b
′
5,
Ui(s
∗) ≤ −α+
∑
j∈[2n]\{j′,j′′}
sj
≤ −α+ 2α− sj′ − sj′′
< α.
(ii) No player chooses b′4.
In this case, one of pi′ and pi′′ does not dominate b
′
4; let pi′ be such a player.
Then, pi′ rules Bj′ , but does not dominate other verticies. Thus, Ui′(s
∗) = sj′ <
α.
Claim 9 implies that s∗ satisfies (C.1), as follows.
Claim 10. s∗ satisfies (C.1).
Proof. Let B = {j ∈ [2n] | βj = 2}. We first verify that |B| = n, and then show
that the two players in Bj for each j ∈ B choose bj,1 and bj,2. Recall that, by
Claim 8, any player can obtain the utility α by changing the strategy to a1.
If |B| = 0, Claim 9 implies that at least 2n+ 1 players choose b′1, b′2, b′3.b′4, b′5.
Thus, some player has the utility at most 0 < α.
If 1 ≤ |B| ≤ n − 1, Claim 9 implies that at least three players choose
b′1, b
′
2, b
′
3.b
′
4, b
′
5, and hence there exists a player pi among the three players who
dominates neither b′1 nor b
′
5. Therefore, since we have 1 ≤ |B|,
Ui(s
∗) ≤ −α+
∑
j∈[2n]\B
sj < α.
If |B| = n + 1, then no player chooses b′1, b′2, b′3.b′4, b′5. Moreover, since only
one player dominates b′4, there exists a player pi such that Ui(s
∗) ≤ α. However,
pi can dominates b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3.b
′
4, b
′
5 by changing the strategy to b
′
4, and thus
(α+ 1) + (−1) + (−α) + (α+ 1) = α+ 1 ≤ Ui(s∗−i, b′4).
By the argument above, we have |B| = n, and hence we have n pairs of players
and the other two players. We below show that a pair of players for Bj , for an
arbitrary index j ∈ B, choose bj,1 and bj,2. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that one of the players chooses neither bj,1 nor bj,2.
If a player chooses bj,3, then, since the other player chooses bj , bj,1 or bj,2,
the utility of the player is −α < α.
If no player chooses bj,3, there exists a player pi choosing bj , and pi dominates
bj and bj,3 together with only one of bj,1 and bj,2 in Bj . In addition to the three
vertices, pi does or does not dominate b
′
4.
In the former case, there must be no player choosing b′3, b
′
4 and b
′
5. Consider
then the other two players who may choose b′1 and b
′
2. If the two players choose
b′1 and b
′
2, one of them has utility zero which is less than α. If only a player pi′
chooses one of b′1 and b
′
2,
Ui′(s
∗) ≤ α+ 1
while
Ui′(s
∗
−i′ , b
′
4) ≥ (α+ 1) + (−1) + (−α) +
∑
j′∈[2n]\B
sj′ + α+ 1
≥ α+ 3.
In the latter case, we have
Ui′(s
∗) ≤ (−α+ sj) + (−α) + α = −α+ sj < α.
We thus complete the proof.
By Claims 8 and 10, it suffices to consider the other two player choosing
vertices in VB . We complete the proof of Lemma 3 with the following claim.
Claim 11. s∗ satisfies (C.2).
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be the two players other than 2n + 2 players satisfying
(C.1) and (C.3). Let S′ ⊆ [2n] be the set of indicies satisfying (C.1).
We first show that one of pi and pi′ chooses b
′
1. Suppose no player chooses
b′1; then Claim 9 implies that at least one of pi and pi′ chooses b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4 and b
′
5;
assume that pi is such a player. Since Claim 10 implies that any player choosing
Bj , j ∈ S′, has utility α; but, the player can obtain, by changing the strategy
to b′1, α+ 1 and does not dominate b
′
3 due to pi.
Let pi be the player choosing b
′
1. We then show that pi′ chooses b
′
5. If pi′
chooses b′2, b
′
3 or b
′
4, then pi′ can increase the utility by changing the strategy to
b′5 by avoiding b
′
3. Otherwise, that is, if pi′ chooses a vertex in Bj , j ∈ [2n]\S′,
then pi cannot dominate b
′
4 and b
′
5, and hence
Ui(s
∗
−i) ≤ α+ 1.
However, by changing the strategy to b′4, pi dominates b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4 and b
′
5 to-
gether with Bj′ for every j
′ ∈ [2n]\(S′ ∪ {j}). Therefore, since |S′ ∪ {j}| < 2n,
Ui(s
∗
−i, b
′
4) ≥ (α+ 1) + (−1) + (−α) +
∑
j′∈[2n]\(S′∪{j})
sj′ + (α+ 1) > α+ 1.
D Proof of Lemma 5
Since the necessity is obvious, we only verify the sufficiency. That is, we show
that if (k,G,w) has a Nash equilibrium, then there exist κ1, κ2, . . . , κm and t
such that k =
∑m
j=1 κj and Pj admits κj players with a common boundary t
for every j ∈ [m]. Note that, if a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) is a Nash
equilibrium, then it trivially holds that νPj (sj) ≤ µPj (sj) for any j ∈ [m].
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s, and let s1, s2, . . . , sm be strategy
profiles for P1, P2, . . . , Pm, and κ1, κ2, . . . , κm be the numbers of players choosing
vertices in P1, P2, . . . , Pm, respectively. Suppose for sake of contradiction that
no common boundary t exists for P1, P2, . . . , Pm with κ1, κ2, . . . , κm. Let t be an
arbitrary integer such that there exists j satisfying νPj (sj) ≤ t ≤ µPj (sj). Then
there is at least an index j′ such that either µPj′ (sj′) < t or t < νPj′ (sj′). Let
J ′<t be the set of indices satisfying the former inequality µPj′ (sj′) < t, and J
′
t<
be the set of indices satisfying the latter inequality µPj′ (sj′) < t.
Consider the case for J ′<t 6= ∅ and J ′t< 6= ∅. In this case, there exists a pair
of indices j′1 ∈ J<t and j′2 ∈ J ′t< such that µPj′1 (sj′1) < νPj′2 (sj′2). Thus, a player
in Pj′1 can increase the utility by changing the strategy to a vertex in Pj′2 .
Consider the other case J ′<t = [m] or J
′
<t = [m]. If J
′
<t = [m], there exists
an index j′ ∈ [m] such that µPj′ (sj′) < νPj (sj); otherwise we can choose
t = min
j′∈[m]
µPj′ (sj′)
as the common boundary. Thus, a player in Pj′ can increase the utility by chang-
ing the strategy to a vertex in Pj . Similarly, if J
′
t< = [m], there exists an index
j′ ∈ [m] such that µPj (sj) < νPj′ (sj′); otherwise we can choose
t = max
j′∈[m]
νPj′ (sj′)
as the common boundary. Thus, a player in Pj can increase the utility by chang-
ing the strategy to a vertex in Pj′ .
E Proof of Lemma 6
We give such an algorithm as a proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that we are given
a path P of n vertices, together with its weight function w and a nonnegative
integer t.
We first note that it is easy to determine whether P admits zero player with
the boundary t. In this case, there is only one strategy profile s = ∅ for (0, P, w),
and µP (s) = +∞ ≥ t. Thus, 0 ∈ K if and only if νP (s) =
∑
v∈V (P ) w(v) ≤ t.
Clearly, this can be done in O(n) time. In the following, we thus assume that at
least one player exists in the game (κ, P,w).
Idea and definitions.
We label the vertices v1, v2, . . . , vn in the path P from left to right. Our
algorithm employs a dynamic programming approach based on the number κ of
players in P , and mainly keeps truck of the first and second rightmost vertices
that are chosen by some of the κ players in P together with the numbers of
players who chose them. However, it should be noted that, because we will add
a new (κ + 1)-th player to the right side of the currently rightmost player, the
utility of the rightmost player may change according to the addition. Therefore,
as a “partial” solution, we introduce the notion of “Nash sub-equilibrium” for a
weighted path, as follows.
Let s be a strategy profile for the game (κ, P,w) such that κ ≥ 1. We denote
by rs the index 1 ≤ rs ≤ n such that vrs is the rightmost vertex chosen by at
least one player in s. Let Qs be the set of all players in s who did not choose
vrs ; we denote by µ(s;Qs) the minimum utility over all players in Qs. For two
integers x and y, 0 ≤ y < x ≤ n, let ν(s; y, x) = maxy≤j≤x Uκ+1(s+vj). In other
words, ν(s; y, x) denotes the potential of the maximum utility under s that can
be expected to gain by an extra player other than the κ players when the extra
player chooses a vertex from vy, vy+1, . . . , vx. Then, a strategy profile s for the
game (κ, P,w) is called a Nash sub-equilibrium with a boundary t if and only if
(1) ν(s; 1, rs) ≤ t;
(2) µ(s;Qs) ≥ t; and
(3) Uj(s−j , v′) ≤ Uj(s) for each player j ∈ Qs and v′ ∈ {v1, v2, . . . , vrs}.
We classify the Nash sub-equilibriums with respect to the first and second
rightmost vertices chosen by players. For notational convenience, we introduce a
dummy vertex v0. Let κ be an integer such that 1 ≤ κ ≤ 2n. Then, we say that(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
is a feasible set on κ if
• x and y are indices of vertices in V (P ) ∪ {v0} such that 0 ≤ y < x ≤ n; and
• a and b are integers such that 1 ≤ a ≤ κ and 0 ≤ b ≤ κ− a.
For a feasible set
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on κ, we say that the path P admits a Nash(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium with the boundary t if and only if there exist a
strategy profile s for (κ, P,w) such that
(1) s is a Nash sub-equilibrium with the boundary t;
(2) exactly a players in s choose vx;
(3) if κ− a > 0, then exactly b players in s choose vy ∈ {v1, v2, . . . , vx−1};
(4) if κ− a = 0, then (y, b) = (0, 0); and
(5) if κ−a−b > 0, then vy ∈ {v2, v3, . . . , vx−1} and each of the κ−a−b players
in s chooses a vertex from v1, v2, . . . , vy−1.
Then,
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
indicates the first and second rightmost vertices vx and vy
chosen by players in s and the numbers of players a and b who chose vx and
vy, respectively. Therefore, the utility Uj(s) of a player j who chose vx can
be computed only by
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
; let Uj
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
= Uj(s) for a Nash(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium. Furthermore, Uj(s−j , v′) can be computed
only by
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
if j is a player who chose vx and v
′ ∈ {vy+1, vy+2, . . . , vn};
let Uj
(
(x, a − 1), (y, b); v′) = Uj(s−j , v′). Similarly, ν(s;x, n) can be computed
by
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
, indeed only by (x, a); let ν′((x, a), n) = ν(s;x, n) for a Nash(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let s be a strategy profile s for the game (κ, P,w) which is a
Nash
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium with the boundary t for some feasible set(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on κ. Then, s is a Nash equilibrium for P with the boundary t if
and only if
(1) ν′((x, a), n) ≤ t;
(2) Uj
(
(x, a), (y, b)
) ≥ t for a player j who chose vx; and
(3) Uj
(
(x, a− 1), (y, b); v′) ≤ Uj((x, a), (y, b)) for a player j who chose vx and
v′ ∈ {vy+1, vy+2, . . . , vn}.
Proof. The only-if-part clearly holds, and hence we prove the if-part. Since s is a
Nash
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium with a boundary t for the game (κ, P,w),
it satisfies
(1’) ν(s; 1, x) ≤ t;
(2’) µ(s;Qs) ≥ t; and
(3’) Uj(s−j , v′′) ≤ Uj(s) for each player j ∈ Qs and v′′ ∈ {v1, v2, . . . , vx}.
Then, Conditions (1’) and (1) ensure that νP (s) ≤ t holds. Similarly, Condi-
tions (2’) and (2) ensure that µP (s) ≥ t holds. Furthermore, Conditions (2’)
and (1) imply that no player j in Qs increases the utility Uj(s) by moving to a
vertex in vx, vx+1, . . . , vn. Similarly, by Conditions (1’) and (2) no player j who
chose vx moves to a vertex in v1, v2, . . . , vx−1. Together with Conditions (3’) and
(3), we thus conclude that s is a Nash sub-equilibrium with a boundary t.
We now define our DP table. For a feasible set
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on an integer
κ ∈ [2n], let
ft
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
=
 true if P admits a Nash
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-
equilibrium with the boundary t;
false otherwise.
Algorithm.
As the initialization, we first compute ft
(
κ, (x, κ), (0, 0)
)
for each integer
κ ∈ [2n] and x ∈ [n]. Let s be the strategy profile for (κ, P,w) such that all the
κ players choose vx. Then, by the brute-force manner, we can check in O(n
2)
time whether s is a Nash
(
κ, (x, κ), (0, 0)
)
-sub-equilibrium with the boundary
t or not. Therefore, ft
(
κ, (x, κ), (0, 0)
)
can be computed in O(n4) time for all
integers κ ∈ [2n] and x ∈ [n].
We then compute ft
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
for each integer κ ∈ [2n] and its fea-
sible sets
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
such that b ≥ 1. Suppose that P admits a Nash(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
-sub-equilibrium s with the boundary t. Then, by removing the
a players who chose vx, we can obtain another Nash
(
κ − a, (y, b), (z, c))-sub-
equilibrium s′ with the boundary t for some feasible set
(
(y, b), (z, c)
)
on κ− a;
recall that the utility is not taken into account for the b players who chose vy
in s′. Therefore, ft
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
= true if and only if there exists at least one
feasible set
(
(y, b), (z, c)
)
on κ− a such that
(1) ft
(
κ− a, (y, b), (z, c)) = true;
(2) the utility of each player j who chose vy is at least t under the condition
that a players chose vx, b players chose vy and c players chose vz;
(3) each player j who chose vy does not move to a vertex in vz, vz+1, . . . , vx
to increase its utility under the condition that a players chose vx, b players
chose vy and c players chose vz; and
(4) the utility of an extra player j′ is at most t under the condition that a players
chose vx, b players chose vy, and j
′ chose a vertex from vy, vy+1, . . . , vx.
For each feasible set
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on κ, we check all feasible sets
(
(y, b), (z, c)
)
on
κ−a. The conditions (1)–(4) above can be checked in O(n2) time for one feasible
set
(
(y, b), (z, c)
)
. Then, we can compute ft
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
in time O(n9) for all
feasible sets
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on κ.
Finally, we compute the desired set K, as follows: An integer κ is in
K if and only if there exists a feasible set
(
(x, a), (y, b)
)
on κ such that
ft
(
κ, (x, a), (y, b)
)
= true and Conditions (1)–(3) of Lemma 12 are satisfied.
This can be done in time O(n7).
In this way, our algorithm runs in time O(n9) in total. This completes the
proof of Lemma 6.
F Proof of Lemma 7
Let P be a path of n vertices. We denote by κ and t by the number of players
choosing vertices in P and a boundary t, respectively.
Proof for (1): If P admits κ = 0 with t, then n ≤ t holds; otherwise, we have
t+ 1 ≤ νP (s). If n ≤ t holds, then P clearly admits κ = 0 with t.
Proof for (2): If P admits κ = 1 with t, then t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 1 holds, as follows.
If n ≤ t − 1, we have µ(s)P ≤ t − 1; and if 2t + 2 ≤ n, then t + 1 ≤ νP (s) no
matter what vertex the player choose.
If t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 1 holds, then P admits κ = 1 with t by taking a strategy
profile in which the player choose the center for odd n (or one of the two centers
for even n) of P .
Proof for (3): If P admits κ = 2 with t, 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 2 holds, as follows. If
n ≤ 2t − 1, then one of the two player has utility less than t: µ(s)P ≤ t − 1. If
2t+3 ≤ n, then t+1 ≤ νP (s), since the two players must choose two neighboring
vertices in any Nash equilibrium s.
If 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 2 holds, P admits κ = 2 with t, as follows. Consider a
strategy profile s in which the two players choose the center and a neighbor of
P if n is odd n, or do the two centers if n is even. Then, clearly s is a Nash
equilibrium, and νP (s) ≤ t and t ≤ µP (s).
Proof for (4): The proof of a similar statement is given in [12], but we give it for
completeness.
If P admits κ = 3 with t, then t = 1 and n = 3, 4, or 5, as follows. If n ≤ 2,
then at least one of the three players has utility zero: µP (s) is not positive.
If n = 3, 4, or 5, we can easily verify that every Nash equilibrium s satisfies
νP (s) ∈ {0, 1} and µP (s) = 1, and hence t = 1. If 6 ≤ n, we show that no
Nash equilibrium exists; there are two cases to consider. If the three vertices are
neighboring each other, then the player in the middle must have utility one, but
can increase their utility by changing the strategy to the one just to the right
(of left) of a vertex outside. If the three vertices are not neighboring, a player
choosing leftmost or rightmost vertex can increase the utility by changing the
strategy to the one next to the middle.
If t = 1 and n = 3, 4, or 5, then P admits κ = 3 with t by taking a strategy
profile in which the three players choose the three centers of P .
Proof for (5): We consider only the case for even κ(≥ 4), since the proof for the
other case is similar.
We define some terms for the proof. Let κ be the number of players, P
be the path of n vertices, and w be the weight function. Let s(1), s(2), . . . , s(κ)
be the vertices the players p1, p2, . . . , pκ choose. Without loss of generality, for
every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, we can assume that s(i) is located in the ith position:
s(1), s(2), . . . , s(i−1) are to the left of s(i). We denote by δ0 the number of vertices
to the left of s(1); for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ κ−1, by δi the number of vertices between
s(i) and s(i+1); and by δκ the number of vertices to the right of s
(κ). Clearly,
δ0, δ1, . . . , δκ determine the number
n =
κ∑
i=0
δi + κ (27)
and the strategy profile s for (κ, P,w). Note that, if s with δ0, δ1, . . . , δκ is a Nash
equilibrium, then δ1 = δκ−1 = 0; otherwise, the first (or the last player) increases
their utility by changing the strategy to the one next to s(2)(s(κ−1)). Moreover,
we can easily observe that if µ(s) ≤ t ≤ νP (s) holds, we have t− 1 ≤ δ0 ≤ t and
t− 1 ≤ δκ ≤ t.
[⇒]
Consider first even κ. We here prove that, if the number n, κ and t do not
satisfy Eq. (14), then (κ, P,w) has no Nash equilibrium such that µP (s) ≤ t ≤
νP (s). If n < κt, then we have n/κ < t, and hence no desired strategy profile
with a boundary t ≤ µP (s) exists.
Suppose (2κ−4)t+κ < n, and the desired strategy profile s with δ0, δ1, . . . , δκ
exists. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, we have δ1 = δκ−1 = 0, δ0 ≤ t and δκ ≤ t.
Thus, it holds that
(2κ− 4)t+ κ− 2t = 2t(κ− 3) + κ <
κ−2∑
i=2
δi + κ.
Therefore, there exists an index i, 2 ≤ i ≤ κ − 2, such that 2t < δi. Thus, an
extra player can gain the utility more than t by choosing the vertex to the right
of s(i), and hence t < ν(s), which is a contradiction.
Consider then odd κ. Suppose for sake of contradiction that n < (κ+1)t−1,
and the desired strategy profile s with δ0, δ1, . . . , δκ exists. By Eq. (27), we have
κ∑
i=0
δi + κ < (κ+ 1)t− 1,
and hence
κ∑
i=0
δi < (κ+ 1)(t− 1). (28)
On the other hand, since s is a Nash equilibrium with a boundary t, we have
t− 1 ≤ δ0, and δ1 = 0; (29)
for any even i satisfying 2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 1, we have
2t− 2 ≤ δi−1 + δi; (30)
and
δκ−1 = 0, and t− 1 ≤ δκ. (31)
Since κ is odd, we can combine the inequalities in (29)−(31), and obtain
(t− 1) + (2t− 2)
(
κ− 3
2
+ 1
)
+ (t− 1) = (κ+ 1)(t− 1) ≤
κ∑
i=0
δi,
which contradicts Eq. (28).
The proof for the inequality n ≤ (2κ− 4) + κ is same as the one for the case
where n is even.
[⇐]
We first consider even κ. We prove by construction that, if the number n, κ
and t satisfy Eq. (14), then P admits κ players with the boundary t, that is,
there exists a strategy profile s such that s is a Nash equilibrium for (κ, P,w)
and νP (s) ≤ t ≤ µP (s).
For a given n satisfying Eq.(14), we can construct the desired strategy profile
s with the following designated δ0, δ1, . . . , δκ.
The strategy profile s: For every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ κ, the parameter δi satisfies
δi ∈

{t− 1, t} if i = 0;
{0} if i = 1;
{2t− 2, 2t− 1, 2t} if 2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 2 and i is odd;
{0, 1, . . . , 2t} if 2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 2 and i is even;
{0} if i = κ− 1;
{t− 1, t} if i = κ.
(32)
Besides, there is an index i∗, 0 ≤ i∗ ≤ κ such that δ0, δ1, . . . δi∗−1 have their
maximum values, while δi∗+1, δi∗+2, . . . δκ have their minimum values.
If i∗ = 0 and δ0 has the minimum value (i.e., δi∗ = δ0 = t − 1), then the
strategy determines
n = (t− 1) +
(
κ− 4
2
+ 1
)
(2t− 2) + (t− 1) + κ
= κt. (33)
If i∗ = κ and δκ has the maximum value (i.e., δi∗ = δκ = t), then the strategy
determines
n = t+ (κ− 4 + 1) 2t+ t+ κ
= (2κ− 4)t+ κ. (34)
To obtain P of n vertices, we can increment the number of vertices one by one
from Eq. (33) to Eq. (34) according to the following procedure: if δi∗ is less than
its maximum value, we just increment δi∗ by one; otherwise, we increment δi∗+1
by one, and i∗ + 1 is now considered to be new i∗. It now remains to show that
s∗ is always a Nash equilibrium and νP (s) ≤ t ≤ µP (s).
We can prove that s∗ is always a Nash equilibrium, as follows. For every i,
1 ≤ i ≤ κ, we can easily observe that
t ≤ Ui(s); (35)
and for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ κ, we have δi ≤ 2t. Thus, any player pi cannot obtain
the utility more than t by changing the strategy to one of δi′ vertices between
s(i
′) and s(i
′+1) where i′ ≤ i− 2 or i+ 1 ≤ i′. Complementally, if pi changes the
strategy to one of δi−1 + δi + 1 vertices between s(i−1) and s(i+1), the utility of
pi is always b(δi−1 + δi)/2c, since our construction implies that one of δi−1 and
δi is even. Thus, s is a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ κ, we have δi ≤ 2t, and hence νP (s) ≤ t, while
Eq. (35) implies that t ≤ µP (s).
For the case where κ is odd, we can verify, in the same way, the statement
by replacing (32) with
δi ∈

{t− 1, t} if i = 0;
{0} if i = 1;
{2t− 2, 2t− 1, 2t} if 2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 3 and i is odd;
{0, 1, . . . , 2t} if 2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 3 and i is even;
{2t− 2, 2t− 2, 2t} if i = κ− 2;
{0} if i = κ− 1;
{t− 1, t} if i = κ.
(36)
